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In the Supreme Court
of· the State of Utah
MARILYN BINGHAM, an infant, by JACK T.
BINGHA~I, her guardian ad litem, and JACK T.
BINGHAM, in his own right,
Plaintiffs and Appellants,
vs.
BOARD OF EDUCATION OF OGDEN CITY,
a public corporation,
Defendant and Respondent.

STATEMENT
Plaintiff, by his amended complaint, (Paragraphs
2 and 3 of which were amended by written stipulation
of counsel to correct a patent error which is not material to this appeal), seeks to recover judgment against
the Board of Education of Ogden City upon two causes
of action growing out of the alleged maintenan~e of a
nuisance upon the open and unprotected public school
grounds where children played at the Central Junior
High School, located at 781 - 25th Street, Ogden, Utah,
wherein the plaintiff's little daughter, less than three
years of age, was severely burned by reason of her
falling into hot ashes, embers, cans, and other burning
and hot substances which were allowed to be scattered
around an op~n, unguarded incinerator placed upon
said school grounds and used by the janitor· as a garbage disposal.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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The first cause of action sought recovery for the
benefit of the child as the result of her injuries. The
second cause of action sought a recovery by plaintiff
himself by way of reimbursement for moneys paid out
by him and bills and obligations contracted for doctor
and hospital bills incurred in the treatment of said child.
Defendant has made no point as to the propriety
of joining these two causes of action, so that we believe
no further mention of the same is necessary.
Defendant filed a general demurrer to each cause
of action upon the ground that neither stated facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action. The trial Court
sustained said demurrer. Plaintiff elected to stand upon
said amended complaint, whereupon the Court entered a
judgment of dismissial as to each cause of action. Plaintiff appeals from the judgment of dismissal.
Two points only are presented for consideration
of this appeal :
1. Is a Board of Education liable in damages for
injuries sustained by a child of tender years who is
injured by and through the maintenance of a nuisance
upon its school grounds 7
2 Does plaintiff's amended complaint allege suffi-

cient facts from which a jury might find that the conditions of which plaintiff complains constituted a nuisance~

STATEMENT OF ERRORS
Appellant relies upon the following errors committed
by the trial Court for a reversal of the judgment of dismissal:
2
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1. THE COURT ERRED IN SUSTAINING DEFENDANT'S GENERAL DEl\IlTRRER TO PLAINTIFF'S .~.\:\!ENDED CCl~IPLAINT AND IN ENTERING ITS JUDG1\IEXT DIS~IISSING EACH OF SAID
CAUSES OF ACTION.
ARGUl\IENT
POINT 1. A· BOARD OF EDUCATION IS LIABLE FOR D.~.\:\l.A. GES SUSTAINED BY AN INFANT
CHILD WHILE PLAYING UPON ITS SCHOOL
GROUNDS SET APART AS PLAYGROUNDS
WHERE SUCH INJURIES WERE CAUSED BY OR
THROUGH THE MAINTENANCE OFA NUISANCE.
It is the contention of the defendant and the theory
of the lower Court that a board of education, being an
agent of sovereignty, is immune from such liability.
The question of sovereign immunity has been a subject of much litigation and on no other subject, perhaps,
is there more confusion among the decisions of the
various courts.
It has been well stated that:
''The ru1e of governmental immunity is subject
to a great number of exceptions, many of which .
are purely arbitrary and without; any relation
to grounds upon which the Courts please to
base the genral rules. The whole doctrine of
governmental 1mtmunity from liability for torts
rests upon a rotten foundation. It is almost
incredible that in this modern age of comparative
sociological enlightenment, and in a republic, the
medieval absolutism supposed to be implicit in
the maxim 'The King can do no wrong' should
exempt the various branches of government from
g·
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liability for their torts and that the entire burden of damages resulting from the wrongful
acts of the government should be imposed upon
a single individual who suffers the injury rather
than . dis~ributed among the entire community
constituting the government, where it could be
borne without hardship upon any individual and
where it justly belongs.''
Comments of Annotator,
75 A.L.R. 1196.
It has been further said:
''Law writers and editors generally have criticized and dis a ppr.oved the doctrine of governmental immunity as illogical and unjust."
Comments of Annotators,
160 A.L.R. 23
22 Virginia Law Review 910
54 Harvard Law Review 437

See also annotations in
- 120 A.L.R. 137 6.

By reason of its harshness and the illogical basis
upon which ·the doctrine rests, Courts quite generally
have restricted rather than extended the doctrine, so
that there are now many recognized exceptions or limitations adopted by many courts. They may be summarized in the language of the· annotator as follows:
''Although the authorities are far from uniform
in this matter, various exceptions or limitations
have been recognized or adopted by some courts
in connection with the rule of tort non liability
as applied to certain agencies or authorities in

4_
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charge of public schools or public institutions
of higher learning, providing·, of course, that
the particular ag·ency or authority is amenable
to suit and that it is the proper party defendant. These exceptions may be summarized as
permitting recovery:
1. For a tort arising out of or committed in
the performance of a proprietary as distinguished
from a governmental function or activity,
2. For damage or injury to private real property
or property rights in respect thereto or consequential injuries thereon resulting from a trespass or the creation or maintenance of a nuisance,
3. For the taking or damaging of private prop..
erty for public use without compensation,
4. For personal injury or death caused by the
creation or maintenance of a nuisance,
5. For injury or death caused by an active or
positive wrong or a wilful or intentional act,
6. Where recovery may be predicated upon
breach of contract rather than tort, and
7. The view bas been adopted by some Courts,
notably those of New York, that a school district or a school board may be liable for its own
acts or ommissions as distinguished from those
of its officers, agents or employees.''
·
Comments of Annotator,
160 A.L.R. 21.
The annotator further comments:
''Although there is authority to the contrary,
several Courts have ruled that municipal corporations in charge of public schools, as well
as school districts and state univerities, which
5
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are amenable to suit, are liable for the creation
~r ma_intenance of a nuisances on school premises resulting in damage to or consequestial
injuries on private real property, even though
committed in the performance of governmental
functions.''
Many cases and text writers are cited by the annotator in support of the above statements. They are
all found in the elaborate notes in the above annotations.
Although there is authority to the contrary, the
general rule of law is that counties, municipal governments, and other governmental agencies created solely
by statute as subdivisions of the government are not
liable for the negligence of its officers or employees
unless expressly provided for by statute.
However, in nearly every jurisdiction, the courts
have held that such an agency, _even though acting in
a governmental capacity, loses its immunity from lia~
bility for damages when its acts or conduct or the acts
or conduct of its employees creates a nuisance and
injuries or damage results from said nuisance.
McQuillan on Municipal Corporation,
Section 2641
states the rule that a municipal corporation when acting in a governmental capacity is liable for injuries
caused by the maintenance of a nuisance.
See also
The Law of Nuisances by Joyce,
Section 346,
whieh also deals 'with this problem and sets forth
the rule that a school district is liable in damages for
6
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injuries sustained when ~aid injuries arise out of the
maintenance of a nuisance by such an agency.
See also
Hoffman Y. City of Bristol,
155 Atl. 499,
wherein the Supreme Court of Connecticut held that
although the operation of maintaining a swimming pool
in a park open to the public in general was a governmental function of the City, the City was liable for
the injuries received by the plaintiff, when, through
the conduct of the City by its employees, a diving board
was maintained over shallow water which rendered
the use of the diving board inherently dangerous.
On Page 500 of 155 Atl. the Court used the following language :
''Where a municipal corporation creates and
maintains a nuisance; it is liable for damages
to any person suffering special injury therefrom,
ir;respective of whether the ..misfeasance or nonfeasance causing the nuisances also constituted
negligence. ·The liability cannot be avoided on
the ground that the municipality· was exercising
governmental functions or powers, even in jurisdictions where, as here, immunity is afforded
from liability for negligence in the performance
of such functions.''
6 McQuillin on Municipal Corporations,
815 et seq.; 43 Corpus Juris·, p. 956.
''If the natural tendancy of the act complained
of is to create danger and inflict injury upon
the person or property he found a unisance as a
matter of fact; but,· if the act in its inherent
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nature is so hazardous as to make the danger
e~t,~eme and serious injury so probable as to be
almost a certainty, it should be held a nuisance
as a matter of law."
·
Melker vs. New York, 190 N. Y.
481, 83 N. E. 565, 16 L. R. A.
(N. S.) 621, 13 Ann Cas. 544.
While, as we have seen, Connecticut has so far
aligned with those states which do not hold a
municipality liable for negligence in the performance of governmental functions and duties
we have definitely and repeatedly recognized
that a sirp.ilar immunity does not attach to nuisance created by it.'' .
·
In an early Indiana Case,
Haag vs. Board of Commissioners
of Vanderburg County,
60 Indiana 515,
the same question was presented to the Supreme Court
of Indiana. In that instance the plaintiff had charged
the County with maintaining a nuisance, to wit: a pest
house, to her determent and resulting in injuries to
her property and also had charged that the maintenance of such a nuisance caused the· death of three
of her children through infectuous disease. The Supreme Court of ·Indiana. on Page 515 · of the decision
used the following language:
''A municipal corporation has no more right
to maintain a nuisance than an individual would
have, and· for a nuisance maintained upon its
prope~ty, the same liability !attaches against
a city, as to an individual.''
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We regard the ·rule thus laid down as correct in
principle and as equally applicable to a county.
Upon a careful review· of the authorities, we are led
to the conclusion, that the several paragraphs of the complaint are sufficient upon demurrer, and that the court
erred in holding them otherwise.

In the case of
Pearce et al vs. Gibson County
et al, 64 SW 33, ·
the Supreme Court of Tennessee enjoined the defendant, Gibson County, from creating a nuisance which
would be detrimental to the plaintiffs. The Court in
its ruling used the follo~ng language :
''But it is· well settled that a municipalty or
county, in in the construction of a public work,
is not privileged to commit a nuisance to the
special injury of the citizens, and for such act
is liable as a private individual in damages, or
if may be restrained by the writ of injunction."

In
56 Corpus Juris, page 530,
Section 621,
the general law is set forth as follows:
''The district is ... however liable where its acts
and ommissions result in the creation of a
nuisance ... to persons suffering special damage
therefrom.''
In a rather recent case; the· Idaho Supreme Court
has held that an action would lie against a. school district to enjoin a nuisance.
9·
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Hansen vs Inde.pendent School
District,. 98 P .2d 959
The subject is treated in
39 Am. Jur. 837, Section 41.

In view of the fact, however, that our own Court
has on frequent occasions discussed this matter, we
feel that further citations are unnecessary.
Section 75-9-8, Utah Code
Annotated, 1943,
expressly authorizes suits to be brought against. the.
Board of Education. This· Court has repeatedly adopted
the more humanitarian trend of limiting rather than
extending sovereign immunity. It has adopted the socalled liability for negligence committed in a proprietary as distinguished from governmental pursuit. It
has also adopted the theory of liability for damaging
property without compensation, as distinguished from
the taking of property without compensation.

In the case of
Croft vs. Millard County Drainage
District, 59· U tab 121,
202 Pac. 539,
Mr. Justice Thurman, speaking for the Court, uses the
following language:
''It is difficult to understand upon what principle such a corporation (a drainage district) can
claim the right to enter upon the land of another
and perpetrate wrongs thereon resulting in a
substantial injury and when confronted in a
c.ourt of justice with a claim for damages under·
take to defend itself upon some technical appli·
10
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cation of the antiquated idea that 'The King can
do no wrong' or, if he does, the wrong is simply
damnum absque injuria. In the darkest ages of
medieYal history "'"hen despotic rule flourished
among the semi-barbarous nations of the old
world, it was even then considered barely tolerable to assert in behalf of kingly rule the doctrine
that 'The King ca11 do no wrong.' Upon what
principle, then, in the twentieth century of the
Christian era, in the most enlightened age of the
world, in a free American commonwealth, should
a voluntary corporation, created solely for private benefit, be permitted to invoke the same
doctrine in order to escape the consequences of
wrongs either deliberately or carelessly perpetrated against the property rights of another?
Even the state itself, when acting within the
scope of its sovereign powers, cannot take or
damage private property for public use without
making just and adequate compensation to the
person to whom the property belongs.''
We believe that the case of
Husband vs. Salt Lake City,
92, Utah 449,
69 P. 2d 491
is decisive of the question in this jurisdiction.
In that case each of the five judges then sitting
wrote separate opinions, and while the members of the
Court differed sharply on whether the complaint in fact
alleged a nuisance, yet all five members of the Court,
including Mr. Justice Wolfe, seemed without question
, , to accept the doctrine that sovereign immunity does not
apply where the sovereign maintains or permits a
nuisance upon its premises. The only difference is that
the Husband case relates to a municipal corporation
11
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rather than a board of education, but, as we have pointed
out supra, numerous Courts and text· writers draw no
distinction between a board of education and any other
kind of agency of sovereignty.
We desire to call attention particularly to the
language of Mr. Justice Wolfe in his separate, concur.
. .
r1ng op1ruon :
''But I am willing to hold the city liable on the
theory of respondeat superior for the negligence
of the driver of this sprinkling wagon. I think
the decisions have gone to ridiculous lengths in
giving municipalities immunity from the negligence of their employees on the ground that the
work in which such employees were engaged was
in pursuance of governmental purpose. In the
case of Lehi City vs. Meiling, 87 Utah 237, 48 P.
2d 530, I had something to say about the continual
growth in the extent and kind of municipal functions and the obscurity of the line between governmental and proprietary functions.''
Again:
''I am in favor of restricting municipal immunity
for the negligence of its employees while engaged
in the city's business to that commited in the
pursuit of actual protection of persons and property or preserving the peace of the community
or some other police duty which it exercises as an
agency of the state.''
In other words, Mr. Justice Wolfe, while holding
that the complaint in question did not allege a nuisance,
yet he believed that the complaint stated a cause of
a.ction.
It is submitted, therefore, that in vie~ of the pre·
vious pronouncements of this Court, that it will now

12.
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adhere to the enlightened and hnmanitarinn dor+rine
that any agenc-y of government is not immune from suit
for damages or injury to person or property caused by
the maintenance of a nuisance.

POINT. 2. PLAINTIFF'S AMENDED COMPLAINT STATES FACTS SUFFICIENT TO SUPPORT A FINDING OF A JURY THAT THE CONDITION OF WHICH PLAINTIFF COMPLAINS WAS
IN FACT A NUISANCE.
In the event this Court accepts our contention as
to Point 1, then it becomes necessary to determine
whether or not plaintiff's amended complaint states a
cause of action. That is, whether or not sufficient
facts are alleged in the complaint, all of which are admitted by the general demurrer, from which a jury
could find that the defendant did in fact maintain a
nuisance upon its school grounds.
Our statute,
Section 103-41-1, Utah
Code Annotated, 1943,
provides as follows:
''Whatever is dangerous to human life or health,
and whatever renders soil, air, water or food
impure or unwholesome, are declared to he nuisances and to be illegal, and every person,
whether owner, agent or occupant, having aided
in creating or contributing to the same or who
may support, continue, or retain any of them, is
guilty of a m.isdeameanor.''
Reverting to the Husband case, cited supra, the
members of this Court, as then constituted, divided
sharply on the question of whether or not the complaint
13·
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in that case alleged facts sufficient to constitute the
operation of the sprinkling wagon a nuisanee. Mr~
Justice Hansen was of the opinion that a jury might
well find from the facts alleged in the complaint that
the same constituted a nuisance. The other members of
the Court disagreed with Mr. Justice Hansen on this
question.
Mr. Justice Hansen in his dissenting opinion quotes
extensively from various cases in an attempt to define
the term ''nuisance.'' H;e says:
''The term 'nuisance' has been said to be incap~
able of definition so as to fit all cases 'because
the controlling facts are seldom alike and each
case stands on its own footing.''
He quotes with approval from the case of
Dahl vs. Utah Oil Refining Company,
71 U tab 1, 262 Pac. 269,
which held that in determining whether a business as
conducted constituted a nuisance, the question was one
of degree and must be detertW.ned by the facts and circumstances involved, being a questio~ of fact. He then
quotes from .
46

c. J.

654

as follows:
''The question as to what eonstitutes a nuisance
depends upon the nature and result of the acts
of which complaint is made and not upon the
means by which produced or the particular description applied to them. Whether a nuisance
exists is a question to be determined, not merely
by an abstract consideration of the thing itself;
1~
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but in reference to its circumstanees. For instance, the reasonableness of the use, the locality,
the extent of the injury, the nature and effect
of the matters complained of, are matters that
must be considered. No particular fact is conclusiYe. All the attending circumstances must be
taken into consideration.''
He further states:
"It frequently happens that the same act or
omission may constitute negligence and at the
same time give rise to a nuisance, and the ~xist
ence of a nuisance frequently may presuppose
negligence, the two torts being co-existing and
incapable of separation. (Citing cases) Whether
a given situation, therefore, gives rise to an action
based solely upon negligence or solely upon the
creation or existence of a nuisance may become
a most difficult question to decide, but the mere
difficulty involved cannot alter the necessity to
make a decision whenever the facts and circumstances create that necessity. The law has long
recognized the two types of tort and has established principles and remedies to govern each.
It is the Court's duty to apply such principles
and remedies. The inability to precisely delineate, by a satisfactory formula, the division between negligence and nuisance, must of necessity
leave the Court and triers of the fact more or
less free to say whether negligence or a nuisance
is involved in any particular case. But as a
guide the following principles have been enunciated. To find a nuisance the dangerous condition must have been consciously created. That
is, during the performance of its acts the defendant must have known or it must have been obvious
and practically certain to a reasonably prudent
person that what it was doing was creating or

15
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was helping to create a dangerous condition. The
condition brought about by its acts must have
been a conscious objective of the defendant or its
. acts must have been so reckless and unwarranted
as to conclusively imply such intention. The acts
which give rise to the condition may be negligent
acts but if the condition itself which these acts
produced was an objective of the defendant. and
was dangerous, or if the defendant, as a reasonably prudent person obviously and certainly must
have known that the condition which it was creating was or would be dangerous, then, even though
it did not intend danger or the unfortunate results, it was under obligation to refrain from
performing the acts creating such condition. It
then becomes no longer a question of exercising
care in the performance of such acts. It becomes an absolute duty not to pe'rform the
creative acts at all. The wrongfulness thus has
shifted to the doing of the acts. as distinguished
from the mere failure to exercise care in their
performance. A nuisance arises from the violation of an absolute duty not to do and is thus
distinguished from negligence which involves the
requisite care in the doing."
We have quoted somewhat liberally from Mr. Justice
Hansen's opinion for the reason that, as we understand
it the other members of the Court found no fault with
' Justice Hansen's dissertation on the law of nuisance,
Mr.
but rather concluded that the facts and circumstances
involved did not measure· up to the requirements of a
nuisance.
The subject of what constitutes a nuisance is dis·
cussed in
39 Am.. J ur. 380, Section 2.

16
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In the case of
Hall vs. Putneys, 10 NE 2d 204,
the following definition 'Yas used by the court:
'• The term 'nuisance' extends to everything that
endangers life or health, g·ives offense to the
sense, violates the la'Y of decency, or obstructs
the reasonable and comfortable use of property.''

In
39 Am. Jur. 282, Section 4,
the author distinguishes between ''nuisance'' and '' negligence.''
In the case of
Hoffman vs. City of Bristol, supra,
a rather complete discussion of what constituted nuisance
according to the facts therein involved was entered
into by the Court and the Court on page 501 of 155 Atl.
reached the following conclusion:
''In the Hewison Case the weight overhanging the
street, in theDyer case the dead tree within the
street limits, in the Riccio Case the tree protruding over the highway, in the Rogers Case
the catch-basin cover, if constituting a nuisance,
was such that the only duty of the city was to
remove or abate it. If it was not a structure or
condition created by the city, certainly not by
acts which were wrongful in nature or in intent
actual or implied; the fault, if any, consisted in
the failure to use requisite care in remedying a
condition othe_rwise created or occurring. Therein lies the distinction between nuisance to which
governmental immunity does not attach, and mere
negligence as to which it is available. Herman
v. Buffalo, 214 N.Y. 316, 108 N.E. 451."

17
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There are many other cases which could be cited
but we doubt that it would be helpful to the Court.
Many of them are cited in Mr. Justice Hansen's opinion
in the Husband case.
It seems to us, therefore, that the real question presented is whether or not the allegations of the amended
complaint do in fact allege a condition which was so
obviousl~ dangerous to life, and particularly to the
lives of small children, that a jury might find, as a question of fact, that the same would in fact constitute a
nuisance. With that thought in mind, let us look to the
allegations of the amended complaint on this subject.
It is alleged in Paragraph 5 (a) that the defendant, by and through its agents, operated and main·
tained a certain incinerator consisting of a cylindrical
body of steel or similar construction 43 inches in dia·
meter and 52 inches in height; that was provided with
an opening at or near the bottom, approximately 15
inches in diameter, with another opening at or near
the center approximating 15 x 11 inches, into which
was deposited, from day to day, various and sundry
books, magazines, papers debris and other combustible·
materials. That there \Yas also deposited therein empty
cans and other trash, and that at regular periods
the same was ignited and burned, and tliat the hot
ashes, embers, cans and other hot and burning sub..
stances were either permitted to be discharged through
said opening or were removed from said incinerator
and allowed to .accumulate while still hot and burning over several feet distance from said incinerator,
and that the same was allowed to remain in an
open and unguarded place upon the open school grounds
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adjacent to an area reser\'·ed for children of all ages
to play thereon and in that immediate vicinity.
While of course a Yie"T of this incinerator and the
way it "Tas operated is not available to the members
of this Court, it "Till be available to a jury if the case
is tried. But "Te submit that this description of the
large incinerator, of the materials ''"'hicb were burned
therein, and of the ""ay the hot residue was removed
therefrom and allowed to accumulate for some distance
therefrom, certainly created a condition that was dangerous to life and limb. Then, too, it must be remembered and it is so alleged that this area was open playground where chil~ren of all ages assembled for recreational activities.
It is further alleged that this condition existed for
a long time prior to the 14th day of October, 1948, with
the knowledge of the defendant.
It is further alleged that it was further known to
the defendant that small children of pre-school age
residing in the neighborhood customarily played upon
these school grounds with the knowledge and acquiescence of the defendant, and that the defendant knew
or should have known that the natural tendency of
allowing this condition to exist did create a dangerous
and hazardous condition and that it might inflict injury upon children of tender years who resorted to said
schoolgrounds for play.
All of these facts are admited by the demurrer.
We cannot conceive of a more dangerous situation.
It is difficult to understand bow a sc.bool board would
permit an incinerator to be placed upon a playground
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where children of tender years resorted for play, and
it is beyond understanding why it would permit the hot,
burning substances to be removed therefrom and scattered, while still hot and burning, around the incinerator, without any protection to small children. Certainly
it ought to be obvious to anyone that children run and
play and that a child of tender years might conceivably
trip or fall into the hot, burning embers. We say that
. if the defendant permitted a condition like that to exist
over a period of time, that it constituted more than
mere negligence, that it was a nuisance as defined by
our own statute. Or at any rate we say that a jury
might very well find from such a condition that a nuisance in fact existed.
As we view it, the other allegations of the complaint are immaterial to the question raised upon this
appeal. It is, however, alleged that on the 14th day of
October, 1948, this little child, two years of age, daughter of the plaintiff, who lived near the school grounds,
was riding a tricycle on the playgrounds and .that while
passing near this incinerator she either tripped or was
otherwise thrown or fell from the tricycle into these
hot ashes and burning embers, cans and other debris,
which was scattered about the incinerator, and that
she was severely burned. The extent of her injuries is
alleged as well as the terrific cost to the father for hospital and doctor bills. This little girl, notwithstanding
e;tensive plastic surgery, Is permanently disfigured
and maimed for life.
It certainly presents a case where, in the language
of writers, it seems humanitarian that this loss should
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be borne by the members of Ogden City's school district than to be heaped upon this little girl and her
father.

CONCLUSION
Appellants urge \Yith all the sineer~ty they posses
that this Court should adopt the modern, humanitarian
view that a board of education should not be immune
from from maintaining or permitting a nuisance to be
maintained upon its public school grounds, and furthermore that the allegations of this amended complaint, all of which are admitted by the demurrer, state
facts sufficient to permit a jury, if believed, to find
that the condition therein described was in fact a nuisance and that the order of the lower Court sustaining
the demurrer and dismissing the action should be reversed.
Respe~tfully

submitted,

Thatcher & Young,
1018 First Security B:ank Bldg.,
Ogden, Utah
William H. Bowman,
Thatcher Building,
Pueblo, Colorado
Attorneys for
Plaintiffs and Appellants.
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